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Enforceability of affordable housing restrictions:
Dieckmeyer v Redevelopment Agency, 2004
Roger Bernhardt
Although condominium owner who purchased unit under affordable housing program was
entitled to prepay loan, she was not entitled to reconveyance of trust deed that also secured
her compliance with affordable housing restrictions.
Dieckmeyer v Redevelopment Agency (2004) 118 CA4th 1136, 13 CR3d 624
In 1994, Dieckmeyer purchased a condominium unit under an affordable housing program.
The unit was subject to recorded CC&Rs that, among other things, restricted transfer for 30 years
and required subsequent buyers to qualify as lower or moderate income. The CC&Rs also
contained an increased-income exception, which provided that “owner-occupants who were
qualified buyers on the date of sale but are no longer qualified by virtue of an elevation of
household income since the date of sale will not be subject to this affordability covenant.” In
connection with the purchase, Dieckmeyer executed a promissory note for $23,000 in favor of
the City for a loan to finance the purchase. A deed of trust secured repayment of the note and
Dieckmeyer’s compliance with the CC&Rs. In 2001, Dieckmeyer decided to prepay the loan. In
exchange for accepting her prepayment, the City wanted Dieckmeyer to execute a new deed of
trust to secure performance of the affordable housing restrictions. Dieckmeyer successfully
petitioned for a peremptory writ of mandate that compelled the City to provide a payoff amount,
accept payment, cancel the note, and reconvey the deed of trust.
The court of appeal reversed, holding that although Dieckmeyer was entitled to prepay the
loan, she was not entitled to reconveyance of the trust deed. The court explained that the trust
deed secured both the loan and the affordable housing restrictions. The court stated that
Dieckmeyer’s partial performance, i.e., paying off the loan, did not extinguish the lien to the
extent it secured the restrictions. Therefore, Dieckmeyer was not entitled to reconveyance and
the City had no need of a second deed of trust because the existing deed of trust would remain as
security for Dieckmeyer’s obligations under the CC&Rs.
The court also rejected Dieckmeyer’s argument that she was released from the obligations of
the CC&Rs under the increased-income exception. The court explained that the only reasonable
interpretation of the exception was that it freed an owner from the restriction limiting occupancy
to low- or moderate-income households, but nothing more. The court refused to interpret the
exception in a manner that would allow a unit to be sold at market price when the owner’s
income increased, as this would completely undercut the reason for the 30-year transfer
restriction.
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: Ironically, the City lost because it drafted good documents some
years earlier. The court held that the City did not need to get a new deed of trust precisely
because the original one it had required the owner to sign when she first purchased the
property remained in effect to secure the surviving obligations, even after the underlying
debt was paid off. While licking its wounds over the fact that it has to pay Ms. Dieckmeyer
her attorney fees, the City should nevertheless appreciate that it may have gained an

important holding regarding the validity of the documents it previously invented. At least as
far as all other transactions are concerned, the City has been the prevailing party.
A housing accommodation is made affordable not by virtue of cheap construction, but
because a government subsidy enables it to be purchased for less than market value.
Because the subsidizer is usually interested in keeping the accommodation “affordable” and
occupied only by those who need it most (qualified, low- and moderate-income purchasers),
the original purchaser cannot be allowed to capture the value of the subsidy by turning
around and reselling the unit “at market” to someone wealthy enough to pay that much.
A covenant in the deed that requires the grantee only to sell to a similarly qualified
purchaser, or that gives the government a right to approve any future resale (here both
approaches were taken), ensures the proper qualifications of the next owner. If the covenant
is made to run with the land, it will also apply to future owners as well. Under these
circumstances, it is unlikely that any court would conclude that a covenant restricting
purchases to low- or middle-income buyers would constitute an invalid restraint on
alienation.
However, a covenant like that does nothing to keep the price down (except somewhat
indirectly by confining the pool of eligible purchasers to poor people). More must be done.
Could Ms. Dieckmeyer have been made to further covenant that she would not resell her
property at a price in excess of some specified formula? Had she done so, could the
covenant have been enforced by way of injunction or invalidation of the sale, or by liability
in damages for the overage collected? Those would be difficult questions to answer under
an affordability covenant.
The City of Huntington Beach, however, went in a different direction. Because it was
also making her a down payment loan that would ultimately have to be repaid, it demanded
a share of the profits as well. Had this participation arrangement appeared in the promissory
note (as a contingent interest), it would certainly have worked, but it probably would have
disappeared once the note was paid off. Since the deed of trust secured the CC&Rs as well
as the note, it would survive the payoff of the note, but the profit participation feature would
still be gone, due to satisfaction of the note. If all of that is what the City was originally
worrying about, it was much smarter to put the profit provision in the loan agreement rather
than the note, and to have the deed of trust secure the entire loan agreement and not just the
note.
I think it would have been even smarter to also have included the profit participation
provision in the CC&Rs. Although this opinion did not cover the point, it seems to me an
argument could have been made that the loan agreement itself came to an end once the loan
was paid off, which would again take profit participation out of the picture. Did the loan
agreement really provide that paying an equity share was a part of the loan such as to
survive after the principal balance of the loan was paid? Even if it did say so, was that valid
or did it constitute some kind of clog on the equity of redemption? The CC&Rs were
designed to have a longer potential life than the loan, and since the deed of trust secured
them as well, it would outlast both the note and the loan agreement.

Indeed, I would have included a provision in the CC&Rs themselves saying that any
resale profits were to be shared between covenantor and covenantee for so long as the
covenants endured, whether or not the original loan still existed. That way, even if the deed
of trust was cancelled, intentionally or inadvertently, the CC&Rs would continue and would
bind successive owners by their own force; securing the CC&Rs by the deed of trust
improved remedies for their breach, but did not enhance their duration or “running”
features. (For more observations on running covenants, see comment to Greenbriar Homes
Communities, Inc. v Superior Court (2004) 117 CA4th 337, 11 CR3d 371).
Proper construction of the transaction should depend to some degree on what social
purpose was being served by this particular arrangement. That prompts me to ask, just how
does a profit split keep an accommodation affordable? Its main effect seems to be to ensure
that a poor property owner is less likely to climb out of poverty. Is that what the City
intended, or was it tempering its altruism with a bit of predatory banking fever? —Roger
Bernhardt

